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The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 1997The year under review witnessed a 
plethora of regional meetings, on a 
range of important issues but with 
variable outcomes. The meetings 
included the second major fisheries 
conference, the Forum Economic 
Ministers Meeting, the annual South 
Pacific Forum, the first ever Pacific 
Islands Leaders Summit held in Japan, 
and the Thirty-Seventh South Pacific 
Conference celebrating the organiza-
tion’s fifty-year existence. Two issues 
that continued to disturb regional gov-
ernments were the shipments of radio-
active materials across the Pacific en 
route from France to Japan, and the 
prospect of nuclear waste being stored 
in the Pacific. Australia’s credentials in 
the region plummeted to new depths in 
1997. The first incident concerned a 
leaked document, prepared by Austra-
lian officials, which contained offen-
sive references to island governments 
and leaders. In addition, Australia 
once again showed itself at odds with 
its island neighbors over the need for 
extensive and binding cuts to green-
house gas emissions to combat global 
warming.
The Second Multilateral High Level 
Conference on Conservation and Man-
agement of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Central and Western 
Pacific (mhlc2) was held in Majuro, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, in 
June. This was a landmark meeting 
that demonstrated a concerted attempt 
by fishing nations and Pacific Island 
states to define an approach for the 
joint management of regional fisheries 
stocks. Of course, the key players have 412different perspectives. Pacific Island 
nations are keen to protect their juris-
diction over highly migratory stocks 
within their exclusive economic zones 
and to increase the financial returns 
from distant-water fishing nations. For 
their part, those nations want to secure 
their access to the region’s stocks and 
exercise some control over resource 
management.
As seventy per cent of the world’s 
fishing grounds have been over-
exploited or depleted, both sets of 
parties have a stake in the long-term 
sustainability of the relatively abun-
dant tuna stocks in the Pacific. With 
this end in mind, the Majuro Declara-
tion committed all parties to coopera-
tively establishing a legally binding 
conservation and management mecha-
nism within three years. Specific details 
of these measures are to be drafted by 
technical working groups and submit-
ted to the mhlc3 in mid-1998. Island 
states viewed the conference as a 
success because they received recog-
nition of principles such as sovereignty 
within exclusive economic zones and 
the need for special assistance to small 
island states for monitoring, control, 
and surveillance. Nevertheless, a 
number of potentially divisive issues 
were not addressed by the conference, 
and future negotiations promise to be 
challenging (Tarte 1997).
Another positive sign of progress in 
regional cooperation was the outcome 
of the Forum Economic Ministers’ 
Meeting held in Cairns, Australia, in 
July. The ministers developed a com-
prehensive rolling Action Plan that 
political reviews • the region 413encompasses economic reform, public 
accountability, investment and tariff 
policies, and multilateral trade issues. 
They will submit annual reports on 
their progress in implementing the 
plan. They agreed to establish national 
economic reform strategies, which 
include measures to ensure that deliv-
ery of essential services is maintained 
and potentially adverse social impacts 
are minimized. A number of princi-
ples for best practice accountability on 
the part of governments were also 
adopted. These included government 
accounts to be promptly audited and 
publicly available, government con-
tracts to be openly advertised and 
competitively awarded, and contraven-
tion of financial discipline to be 
promptly disciplined. The ministers 
decided to pursue open, liberal, and 
transparent investment policies consis-
tent with apec nonbinding investment 
principles. They also endorsed the 
work of the Forum Regional Security 
Committee to improve coordina-
tion between countries to counter 
unwanted financial activities, espe-
cially the kind of financial scams that 
have been widespread in recent years.
Unfortunately, the work of the 
Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting 
was completely overshadowed by the 
publication of a confidential Austra-
lian government briefing paper that 
contained disparaging assessments of 
island governments and their leaders 
(Australian Delegation Brief 1997). 
This caused a diplomatic sensation and 
promises to undermine Australia’s 
relations with its diminutive neighbors 
for years to come. The 93-page docu-
ment, marked “Australian Eyes Only,” 
was left lying on a table in the foyer at the meeting. It was picked up by two 
journalists, and excerpts of its more 
lurid contents were subsequently 
splashed across the regional media, 
causing embarrassment and dismay 
among regional governments. Pacific 
Island countries are accustomed to 
Australia making harsh critiques of 
their economic performance and finan-
cial management. To some extent they 
acknowledge these shortcomings, as 
evidenced in their preparedness to 
participate in the ministers’ meeting 
and work together on reform strate-
gies. However, nothing could have 
prepared them for the scathing tone of 
the document.
Its authors engaged in simplistic 
stereotyping of island economies, 
grouping the Pacific nations into crude 
categories according to perceived eco-
nomic standing. Nauru and the Cook 
Islands were thus relegated to the sub-
heading “Bottom of the Heap,” while 
the Marshall Islands and the Federated 
States of Micronesia were dismissively 
labeled “Imprudent Micronesians.” 
Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and 
Solomon Islands were subject to a 
colorful characterization of their own: 
“Melanesian Mayhem.” Microstates 
deemed to be adequately “managing” 
their affairs for the time being included 
Niue, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Palau. 
Only Tonga and Samoa received praise 
as “Prudent Polynesians,” while Fiji 
was singled out as the “Best of the 
Bunch.” The plight of the less fortu-
nate microstates was blamed squarely 
on leadership factors, including allega-
tions of corruption, economic misman-
agement, and a failure to implement 
reforms agreed by Forum members 
and by those receiving conditional 
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authors could not resist making 
sweeping generalizations such as: 
“Pacific leaders will continue to flirt 
with . . . quick-fix, easy money 
schemes and over-exploitation of 
natural resources” (Australian Delega-
tion Brief 1997, 42). Overall, the 
analysis lacked nuance, and any seri-
ous recommendations grounded in 
valid concerns were overshadowed by 
the sensationalist and often patroniz-
ing tone.
Aspects of the report that caused 
most indignation around the region 
involved gratuitous denigration of the 
personal style and traits of several 
island leaders, including their drinking 
habits and behavior under the influ-
ence of alcohol. In particular, the 
authors focused on politicians who 
had exhibited hostility toward Austra-
lia. Papua New Guinea’s then finance 
minister, Chris Haiveta, was described 
as being “combative towards Austra-
lia,” while Vanuatu’s commerce minis-
ter, Barak Sope, was accused of having 
demonstrated Marxist and anticolonial 
sentiment. Similarly, Fiji’s then finance 
minister, Berenado Vunibobo, was 
portrayed as “temperamentally vola-
tile” and “given to Third World 
posturing against Western colonial-
ism.” The paper also took potshots at 
New Zealand for its alleged efforts to 
compete with, or even “under-cut,” 
Australian policy in the region. The 
prime minister of the Cook Islands, Sir 
Geoffrey Henry, came in for a mixed 
appraisal that charged him with bring-
ing his nation to the brink of economic 
catastrophe. While characterized as 
“articulate and hardworking,” he was 
also considered to be a heavy drinker, “boastful and vain.” The timing of this 
diatribe on Henry was particularly 
unfortunate in view of his role as host 
of the forthcoming South Pacific 
Forum.
How did this monumental diplo-
matic blunder come to pass and who 
was to blame? Clearly there was negli-
gence on the part of junior treasury 
officials who left the briefing docu-
ment lying in a public place. Yet the 
breach in security also stemmed from 
the failure to give such a sensitive doc-
ument a high enough security classifi-
cation to prevent such a leak. It was 
rated “confidential” but, in view of its 
content, “secret” or “top secret” 
would have been more prudent. Of 
more concern was the fact that person-
alized, derogatory, and intemperate 
language was employed in a formal 
written paper. The document was pre-
pared by an interdepartmental work-
ing group as a briefing for Australian 
Treasurer Peter Costello prior to the 
meeting of regional economic minis-
ters. Sources thus included the Trea-
sury, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, AusAid, the Depart-
ment of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
and Australian intelligence agencies. 
However, the main analysis appears to 
have been provided by the Office for 
National Assessments, an intelligence 
agency that reports directly to the 
prime minister and the cabinet.
The Australian government’s 
response was to launch an investiga-
tion into the lapse in security and to 
assert that the document was the work 
of a limited number of public servants 
and in no way reflected official govern-
ment views. Although the contents of 
the paper were acknowledged to be 
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issued no formal apology to island 
leaders over the incident and instead 
merely expressed regret. As journalist 
Jemima Garrett concluded, a more 
appropriate official response would 
have been to “unambiguously repudi-
ate the florid language and unprofes-
sional nature of the work” (PIM, Sept 
1997, 54). The matter was raised dur-
ing the leaders’ retreat at the Forum, 
where island leaders politely advised 
Prime Minister Howard to exercise 
greater control over officials responsi-
ble for writing such papers and to 
tighten security to prevent leaks.
Pacific outrage over the leak 
stemmed not so much from a belief 
that the assessments of island econo-
mies and leaders were flawed, but that 
the tone indicated an attitude of supe-
rior contempt for many regional 
microstates and their leaders on the 
part of Australian public servants, and 
possibly the government itself. Pacific 
Islanders have long suspected Australia 
of harboring neocolonial feelings of 
superiority bordering on racism, and 
this incident merely served to confirm 
such suspicions. Although the paper 
was never meant to go public, its 
attacks on individual leaders were 
anathema to those who preach the 
consensual and face-saving style of the 
Pacific Way. Ironically, while one of 
the aims of the briefing was to identify 
and manage regional politicians who 
are not well disposed toward Australia 
and its assumed role as regional leader, 
the leaked paper itself provoked an 
unprecedented backlash against Aus-
tralia. The resulting atmosphere of dis-
trust will certainly not help to further 
Australia’s campaign to promote and direct economic reform in the region. 
Diplomatic relations with particular 
countries will also be set back as a 
result of key ministers and heads of 
state still smarting from the derisive 
critiques in the document. The net 
effect of this sorry episode for Austra-
lian diplomacy can be summed up as 
“how to lose friends and alienate 
people.”
The Twenty-Eighth South Pacific 
Forum, held in Rarotonga 17–19 
September, focused on the themes of 
Reform, Human Values, and Together-
ness. However, “togetherness” was 
probably not the sentiment uppermost 
in the minds of leaders who were still 
reeling from the abuse doled out in the 
Australian document a few months 
earlier. The standoff caused by Austra-
lia’s intransigence on greenhouse gas 
cuts further soured the atmosphere, 
but more of that later. One issue the 
leaders could agree on was that the 
Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting 
and its Action Plan deserved to be 
applauded, and a high priority was 
accorded to facilitating its implementa-
tion. The successful conclusion of the 
mhlc2 fisheries conference was also 
welcome, and the Forum endorsed the 
concept of a vessel-monitoring system 
to keep track of the vessels of distant-
water fishing nations. The leaders 
expressed satisfaction with the report 
by a Forum delegation to New Cale-
donia on progress toward a 1998 
referendum on self-determination, but 
urged that events continue to be moni-
tored until a durable solution is found 
to the territory’s political status. The 
Forum was particularly encouraged 
by the signs of progress in restoring 
peace to the island of Bougainville and 
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New Guinea wherever possible in 
bringing about lasting peace.
The 1997 Forum reiterated its con-
cerns over continuing operations of the 
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Dis-
posal System. The facility was designed 
specifically to incinerate chemical 
weapons from Germany, Okinawa, 
and Solomon Islands, but not from the 
United States. In 1985 the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency issued a 
ten-year permit for its operations. The 
United States began destroying chemi-
cal weapons at Johnston in 1990, 
despite vociferous protests from Pacific 
Island nations. They opposed the facil-
ity from the outset due to concerns 
over the impact of its untried proto-
type technology on the marine envi-
ronment. In 1991, US President 
George Bush gave a verbal promise to 
Pacific Island leaders that the disposal 
system would be dismantled in 1995, 
when its permit expired. That commit-
ment has not been honored and now 
the US Army is seeking to extend the 
life of the facility up to the year 2005, 
mainly because the program has been 
plagued by problems that have forced 
the periodic shutdown of operations. 
By June 1997, the US Army had 
destroyed 67 percent of the stockpile 
at Johnston Atoll and estimated that it 
only needed three more years to com-
plete the program. It is therefore 
unclear why a permit is being sought 
for an additional eight years. Fears are 
held that if the army gains a lengthy 
extension it may use the facility to 
incinerate chemical weapons currently 
awaiting destruction on the US main-
land. The Forum thus asked, once 
again, that the facility be “permanently closed when the current program of 
chemical weapons and agent destruc-
tion was completed” (Forum Secre-
tariat 1997, para 38).
The Forum leaders adopted the 
Aitutaki Declaration on Regional 
Security Cooperation, which recog-
nized the region’s vulnerability to 
natural disasters, environmental 
damage, and unlawful challenges to 
national integrity. The declaration 
reaffirmed the commitment of Forum 
leaders to taking a comprehensive, 
integrated, and collaborative approach 
to dealing with broadly defined threats 
to security. They also acknowledged 
that security threats could emerge with 
little warning, and the region therefore 
needs to develop mechanisms to facili-
tate consultation in order to respond 
quickly to threats. However, recogniz-
ing that it is best to stop conflict from 
arising in the first place, the Forum 
leaders will focus on developing 
preventive diplomacy, including medi-
ation by the Forum Regional Security 
committee, the Forum secretary-
general, other eminent persons, and 
fact-finding missions. They also agreed 
that procedures be developed to facili-
tate responses by the region’s disci-
plined forces. Attention to regional 
disaster management is particularly 
timely in view of the spate of devas-
tating cyclones in the region and the 
catastrophic drought taking its toll in 
Papua New Guinea.
There have been mixed appraisals 
of the inaugural Pacific Leaders’ 
Summit held in Tokyo on 13 October. 
The Japanese prime minister hailed it 
as an “epoch making event,” but 
others dismissed it as a low-key meet-
ing that failed to scale new heights. 
political reviews • the region 417There is no doubt of Japan’s impor-
tance to the Pacific Islands in terms of 
trade, aid, and fisheries. Japan, too, 
wants to maintain favorable relations 
with the Pacific microstates to ensure 
its continued access to the region’s 
natural resources and to curry the 
favor of its eight voting UN members. 
According to Japan, the summit’s 
objective was to explore new ways of 
achieving economic self-sufficiency in 
the Forum island nations. Not surpris-
ingly, the substance of many papers 
presented by island leaders was to 
build a case, and present a wish list, 
for further overseas development assis-
tance. This was probably a useful 
exercise in identifying development 
priorities. However, the joint declara-
tion issued at the end of the meeting 
mainly restated well-known concerns 
over integration into the global econ-
omy, sustainable development, and the 
greenhouse phenomenon. It was also 
punctuated with polite references to 
Japan’s constructive role in providing 
support for the development and sta-
bility of Forum island countries. Yet 
Japan made no new commitments on 
the aid front (Joint Declaration 1997). 
It remains to be seen whether the 
Tokyo summit will produce any more 
than the fuzzy feelings of friendship 
and goodwill evidenced at the 1990 
Honolulu summit, presided over by US 
President George Bush, which has thus 
far failed to yield tangible results 
(Finin and Wesley-Smith 1997).
On 6 February 1997, the South 
Pacific Commission celebrated its 
golden jubilee, marking fifty years of 
service to the Pacific Island countries 
and territories. Commemoration activ-
ities were held in Noumea, which hosts the commission’s offices, but the main 
event was the Thirty-Seventh South 
Pacific Conference, staged in Can-
berra, which was host to the original 
agreement setting up the organization. 
The mood of the October conference 
was deliberately upbeat as the director-
general (formerly secretary-general), 
Bob Dun, spoke of increased donor 
confidence and improved staff morale 
since he took over management in 
1995. He also took pride in the fact 
that the commission had succeeded in 
balancing the books and consolidating 
its financial situation. His optimism 
was vindicated to some extent by 
Great Britain’s surprise decision to 
rejoin the organization after having 
formally withdrawn in 1995 due to 
dissatisfaction with management. Dun 
was also favorably evaluated and reap-
pointed for a further two years. On a 
disappointing note, however, he did 
admit that the proportion of Pacific 
Islanders employed by the organiza-
tion had fallen from 45 to 35 percent 
during his term in office. The main 
decision of note taken by the confer-
ence was to change the organization’s 
name to Pacific Community in order to 
better reflect the more egalitarian 
nature of its membership and broad-
ened geographic scope. Today twenty-
six countries, territories, and associ-
ated states are members of the Pacific 
Community with each having an equal 
vote regardless of size or status.
Concerns over the transport by sea 
of plutonium and high-level nuclear 
waste through the Pacific Ocean con-
tinued unabated in 1997, despite 
public relations efforts by the compa-
nies engaged in the shipments to 
persuade regional nations of their 
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carried a shipment of forty canisters of 
vitrified high-level waste through the 
Pacific en route to Japan from France. 
The ship is owned by Pacific Nuclear 
Transport Limited, whose fleet 
includes four other licensed irradiated 
nuclear fuel carriers: Pacific Crane 
(formerly Akatsuki Maru) Pacific Pin-
tail, Pacific Sandpiper, and Pacific 
Swan. The shareholders in Pacific 
Nuclear Transport are the same com-
panies as are engaged in reprocessing 
nuclear fuel: British Nuclear Fuel, the 
French cogema, and Japanese nuclear 
fuel utilities.
Caribbean and Latin American 
nations have issued regional state-
ments indicating they do not want 
high-level wastes transported through 
their waters. Although several nations 
and the secretariat of the South Pacific 
Forum have expressed their concern at 
the shipments entering the region’s 
exclusive economic zones, Greenpeace 
argues that the Pacific Ocean has now 
been chosen as the main route for the 
shipments because it is believed to be 
the path of least resistance. Politically, 
the way was prepared for the Pacific 
Teal’s voyage by a delegation of 
nuclear industry officials from France, 
Japan, and Britain. In January the dele-
gation visited Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji in 
order to reassure key regional govern-
ments of the safety of high-level waste 
shipments in their vicinity. In particu-
lar, they emphasized that their ships 
met with the highest safety rating of 
the International Maritime Organiza-
tion, with measures including 25-
centimeter-thick stainless steel con-
tainers, double hulls to withstand colli-sion damage, twin engines, anticolli-
sion radar, and enhanced buoyancy to 
prevent vessels from sinking.
In March, another opportunity for 
convincing doubtful Pacific officials of 
the safety of the shipments presented 
itself at the Regional Seminar on 
Nuclear Issues organized by the Forum 
Secretariat. Richard Rawls, head of the 
Transport Safety Unit of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), 
gave a lengthy presentation outlining 
the comprehensive regulations govern-
ing the safe transport of radioactive 
materials by sea. He dazzled the audi-
ence with an impressive array of over-
heads, diagrams, and statistics 
demonstrating the meticulous stan-
dards applied to nuclear shipments. 
The agency’s regulations were first 
established in 1961 and have been 
revised on several occasions, the last 
being in 1996. In particular, Rawls 
emphasized the rigorous testing under-
gone by the “packages” of stainless 
steel containing nuclear materials. 
These packages are subjected to 
extreme trials, including thermal tests 
of up to 800 degrees Celsius, immer-
sion up to 200 meters, punctures, 
drops of 9 meters, and collisions at 
high speed. In addition, ships licensed 
to transport irradiated nuclear fuel, 
plutonium, and high-level waste must 
meet standards required under an inf 
Code concerning fire and radiological 
protection, temperature control, cargo 
securement, electrical supplies, and 
emergency planning.
Later in the year, the consortium of 
French, British, and Japanese nuclear 
interests extended invitations to aca-
demics and journalists from the Pacific 
to participate in a “visual and hands-
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included guided tours of nuclear repro-
cessing plants and shipment facilities in 
the United Kingdom and France, as 
well as discussions with academics and 
representatives of the nuclear industry. 
Company officials were at pains to 
point out that they maintain standards 
at least as strict as those recommended 
under iaea regulations. The industry 
has also adopted an environmental 
angle to their public relations exercise 
that has considerable persuasive value 
for Pacific Island states, notably that, 
unlike fossil fuels, an advantage of 
nuclear power is that it does not con-
tribute to global warming.
Pacific Islanders have learned to 
exercise a healthy skepticism for assur-
ances made by military and scientific 
authorities in view of their experience 
of nuclear testing and its lasting conse-
quences for health and the environ-
ment. It is disconcerting that, despite 
the rigorous standards regulating 
transport, Richard Rawls has admitted 
that if a “package” were lost in the 
depths of the ocean no attempt would 
be made to retrieve it. Packages are 
only designed to withstand immersion 
in 200 meters of water, yet Rawls 
argued that this is sufficient for 
retrieval of packages lost on the conti-
nental shelf where most fishing takes 
place. However, as Tony Slatyer from 
the Forum Secretariat pointed out, per-
ception counts for at least as much as 
reality in relation to nuclear issues. 
When France resumed nuclear testing, 
though it posed no direct threat to 
popular tourist destinations, tourism 
in the Pacific experienced a serious 
downturn. Slatyer asked the audience, 
rhetorically, to imagine the potential impact on the multibillion-dollar tuna 
industry if a canister of plutonium or 
high-level nuclear waste were to be 
irretrievably lost in the Pacific Ocean.
These concerns were reflected in the 
section of the Forum communiqué 
addressing radioactive waste ship-
ments and accident liability (Forum 
Secretariat 1997, para 32). For some 
time now the Forum has been pressing 
for the revision of international 
nuclear liability conventions to ensure 
that all contingencies are adequately 
covered. The Forum “expected” that 
“shipping states agree to promote the 
safety of the material and provide 
compensation for any industries 
harmed as a result of changes in the 
market value of the region’s fisheries 
and tourism products in the event of 
any accident.” The Forum also noted 
the adoption of the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage, especially its provi-
sions for compensation to victims of 
transboundary damage and recogni-
tion of coastal state jurisdiction over 
actions concerning damage within 
their exclusive economic zones. The 
Forum noted that the nuclear industry 
had been more transparent and forth-
coming with information about ship-
ments in recent times. Nevertheless, 
they continue to be secretive about the 
planned routes for shipments, allegedly 
to minimize the threat posed by terror-
ist attacks on the cargo. This justifica-
tion is far from reassuring. There is a 
need for continued vigilance by the 
region, as another nuclear waste ship-
ment through the Pacific was planned 
for early 1998, and many more are 
expected to follow over the coming 
years.
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benefits of nuclear power over other 
forms of energy, Pacific Island nations 
are aware that the developed world is 
still struggling to find solutions to the 
problem of permanent safe disposal of 
nuclear waste. A “not in my back-
yard” rejection of nuclear waste sites is 
widespread among communities in 
North America, Europe, and some 
East Asian nations. Although the 
region demonstrated its determination 
to prevent the export of nuclear waste 
to Forum island nations by adopting 
the 1995 Waigani ban on such activi-
ties, proposals for nuclear waste stor-
age sites in the Pacific were still being 
pursued in 1997.
An American nuclear waste entre-
preneur, Alex Copson, has been at the 
forefront of efforts to set up a storage 
site for spent nuclear fuel and high-
level nuclear waste in the Pacific. 
Despite opposition from the US gov-
ernment and the South Pacific Forum, 
in January the waste site promoters 
proceeded to submit draft legislation 
to the US Senate. The draft was written 
by Nuclear Disarmament Services, a 
joint US-Russian consortium, of which 
Copson is director. It proposed to 
finance, develop, and commercially 
operate a facility to store spent nuclear 
fuel from Russia and the United States. 
The storage capacity of the facility was 
envisaged to be a minimum of 200,000 
metric tons. The designated sites were 
Wake Island or Palmyra Atoll or both. 
The Clinton administration still 
rejected the plan on the grounds that it 
was in conflict with existing legislation 
including the National Environment 
Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and 
procedures of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The 1997 Forum reiter-
ated its concern over private interests 
contemplating nuclear storage sites in 
the Pacific, but the Forum was encour-
aged by the reaffirmed opposition to 
such plans on the part of the United 
States.
In the face of long-standing regional 
opposition, the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands also continued to enter-
tain the possibility of setting up a low-
level nuclear waste storage site. In 
early 1997, Marshall Islands officials 
accelerated plans to implement a 
feasibility study for a waste facility, 
including the identification of atoll 
communities willing to host such a 
site. In May the government signed a 
contract with a US company, Babbit 
and Wilcox Nuclear Environmental 
Services Incorporated, to undertake 
the study. However, the contract was 
extremely one-sided in terms of liabil-
ity and, pending the outcome of the 
feasibility study, the contract contained 
a commitment to allow the company 
exclusive rights to build and operate a 
nuclear waste repository. In addition, 
the nuclear waste scheme incurred the 
wrath of the US administration and 
many congress members, thus threat-
ening to undermine the Marshall 
Islands’ sensitive negotiations for 
increased compensation to nuclear vic-
tims and for economic assistance once 
the Compact of Free Association 
expires in 2001. Recognizing that the 
costs of a nuclear waste site were, for 
the time being, outweighing its poten-
tial benefits, President Imata Kabua 
unilaterally imposed a freeze on the 
feasibility study in June. Nevertheless, 
the nuclear waste scheme remains a 
last-resort option to generate revenue 
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at a later date.
The threat of climate change did not 
recede from the consciousness of 
Islanders in 1997. At the end of June 
the world’s small island countries 
issued another plea for urgent action 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at 
the second United Nations Earth 
Summit held in New York, highlight-
ing the fact that their very survival was 
in jeopardy. In August the third South 
Pacific Regional Environment Pro-
gram’s Climate Change and Sea Level 
Rise meeting took place in Noumea, 
once again focusing on raising aware-
ness of the likely consequences of 
climate change and the special needs of 
Pacific Island countries. As far as the 
annual South Pacific Forum was con-
cerned, the ante was raised for dis-
cussions of climate change at a prior 
meeting held by the smallest island 
states, including Kiribati, Nauru, 
Tuvalu, Niue, and the Cook Islands. 
They passed a resolution, earlier 
endorsed by the Association of Small 
Island States, calling on developed 
countries to cut their greenhouse gas 
emission levels to 20 percent lower than 
1990 levels by the year 2005. The 
group also made a powerful statement 
on the moral imperative to arrest rising 
sea levels: “The avoidable destruction 
of entire communities and countries 
and their cultures contravenes the basic 
right of every state, large and small, 
rich and poor, to exist. This cannot be 
tolerated by the family of nations” 
(Pacific News Bulletin, Sept 1997, 1).
Climate change was thus set to be 
the most contentious issue at the 1997 
Forum, with island nations already 
well aware of Australia’s resistance to the introduction of uniform and bind-
ing greenhouse gas emission targets on 
developed nations at a forthcoming 
climate change meeting in Kyoto in 
December. From the outset, the Aus-
tralian government was determined to 
prevent the Forum’s annual communi-
qué from including any wording that 
endorsed binding greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions, as this would under-
mine their negotiating position in 
Kyoto. Due to an impasse over this 
issue, officials charged with drafting 
the communiqué failed to achieve an 
outcome acceptable to both the island 
states and Australia. It was left to the 
leaders to thrash out an agreement at 
their annual retreat, but Australia’s 
prime minister, John Howard, refused 
to modify his hardline stance.
Howard ultimately won the battle 
of wills, and the final wording of the 
communiqué could scarcely be termed 
a consensus, given that the strong 
views of the fourteen island leaders 
were watered down to accommodate 
Australia’s position. As a result, the 
communiqué’s annex on climate 
change merely “recognized and 
endorsed the deep concerns regarding 
the impact of greenhouse gas emissions 
on rising sea levels on all Forum mem-
bers” and “urged” countries to make 
“additional efforts in meeting commit-
ments” under the Framework for 
Climate Change Convention. It also 
“recognized” that parties to the Kyoto 
conference could be expected to adopt 
different approaches, effectively 
endorsing Australia’s campaign for 
special treatment in Kyoto. Howard 
had highlighted the need for rapidly 
industrializing countries like China 
and India to join emission reduction 
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This recommendation, too, was 
included in the Forum communiqué 
(Forum Secretariat 1997, Annex).
The media hounded Howard over 
his apparent insensitivity to valid 
Islander concerns over global warm-
ing. Howard was unrepentant, stating 
that he rejected any imposition of 
binding greenhouse gas cuts that 
would damage Australian investment 
and cost jobs. Asked if he thought the 
Australian economy was more impor-
tant than the very existence of low-
lying atoll nations, Howard retorted 
that such “apocalyptic views” were 
“exaggerated” (Australian Financial 
Review, 19 Sept 1997, 11). He also 
argued that the scientific debate over 
the effects of global warming was still 
divided and far from conclusive. Aus-
tralia’s foreign minister, Alexander 
Downer, made efforts to impress on 
island nations that their future was 
very much linked to Australia’s well-
being. He implied that any greenhouse 
gas reduction targets that harmed the 
Australian economy would inevitably 
affect Australia’s ability to continue 
providing aid to the region. Still in 
defensive mode, Downer also alluded 
to Australia as a significant provider of 
aid for environmental projects in the 
Pacific Islands. Clearly, Australia’s size 
and importance as an aid donor in the 
region enabled its views to prevail at 
the Forum; it would not be so easy for 
Australia to throw its weight around at 
the Kyoto climate change conference.
All year Australia had been plotting 
strategies and lobbying likely allies in 
preparation for its stand against uni-
form binding greenhouse gas cuts 
being decided at the meeting of parties to the Framework for Climate Change 
Convention in Kyoto in December. In 
defiance of European Union policy, 
Australia campaigned strongly to have 
differentiated reduction targets for 
countries depending on their econ-
omy’s reliance on fossil fuel production 
and exports. Australian Environment 
Minister Robert Hill made it plain in 
Kyoto that, having a fossil fuel inten-
sive economy, Australia would not sign 
an agreement that would damage its 
economic interests. In issuing this ulti-
matum, Australia held the meeting’s 
achievement of global consensus hos-
tage to its own narrow interests. Evi-
dently, given the relatively small 
absolute contribution Australia makes 
to global greenhouse gases, the meet-
ing reluctantly decided to cave in to the 
blackmail.
The end result was a diplomatic vic-
tory for the Australian government. 
Not only did Australia avoid being 
committed to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, it was granted permission to 
increase such emissions by 8 percent 
between the base year of 1990 and 
2010. Australia was one of only three 
developed countries to obtain such a 
dispensation, whereas the European 
Union, the United States, Canada, and 
Japan were committed to achieving 
reductions of 6–8 percent, and devel-
oped countries on average were 
obliged to reach reduction targets of 
5.2 percent. Australia and the United 
States pushed for the progressive 
involvement of developing countries in 
meeting reduction targets as their emis-
sions are increasing exponentially in 
tandem with industrialization. By con-
trast, Europe believes that developed 
countries ought to set an example first. 
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targets were set for developing coun-
tries. The Pacific Island nations would 
have been relieved that binding targets 
for cuts to greenhouse gas emissions 
had finally been established. Neverthe-
less, the outcome was disappointing 
given that small island states had been 
pressing for targets at least fifteen per-
cent higher than those agreed to in 
Kyoto, and for these targets to be 
achieved within a shorter time frame. 
Sea-level-rise refugees may have to 
become a fact of life before Islander 
concerns on global warming are taken 
seriously.
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